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This paper is a history of discussions, debates and
arrangements leading up to the Australia New Zealand
Closer Economic Relationship (CER), which was
launched 20 years ago. While a large volume to
celebrate the anniversary has been published by the
Australian and New Zealand governments, in fact the
events covered by this official publication were
preceded by another 20 years or so of negotiations,
debates and discussions, some unofficial and some
official, on both sides of the Tasman. While the author
of this policy paper was never an official negotiator,
he was a major driving force behind the arguments
for a regional free trade area, and this account of what
led up to CER has not only historical validity and depth
of detail but also personal acuity and insight.
Introduction
Twenty years ago, on 1 January 1983, the Australia
New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade
Agreement (CER for short) was launched. To
celebrate the anniversary, the Australian Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, collaborating with New
Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, has
published a 746-page volume. It contains selected
documents from ministers, officials and others
engaged in the difficult negotiations that took place
over a five-year period preceding the inception of
the agreement.
The earliest document selected is one from the
Ministry in Wellington to the New Zealand High
Commission in Canberra on 2 September 1977. The
road to CER was much longer than that. The New
Zealand Australia Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
a very limited free trade agreement, came into effect
in 1966. This in turn had been preceded by considerable
debate on the pros and cons of freer trade across the
Tasman among politicians, business people and
academics, especially in New Zealand. Without
NAFTA, there would probably have been no CER.
My interest in the possibility of freeing trade
between Australia and New Zealand was stimulated
by a year’s study at Chatham House in Britain in
1957. My topic was the implications for Britain, New
Zealand and the Commonwealth of the Rome Treaty
to establish a European Economic Community being
negotiated that year. It was useful to be able to
cooperate in work on the issues with Henry Lang,
then Economic Counsellor at the New Zealand High
Commission, and colleagues from Industries and
Commerce and Customs there. I was already concerned
about the debilitating effects on Britain of the Second
World War and the growth of subsidisation of
agriculture there. I could foresee an increase in
pressures for Britain to join the Community that the
six original EEC members were establishing.1  This
increased my concern about New Zealand’s
dependence on the British market for our narrow
range of pastoral exports.
I began to argue publicly that arguments that
had induced the Western Europeans and Latin
Americans to take regional free trade arrangements
seriously were highly relevant to the problems with
which Australia and New Zealand were likely to
 be confronted.
I was never an official negotiator. My first postwar
job in the Prime Minister’s and External Affairs
Department and my teaching responsibilities at the
University, especially in public economics for the
Diploma of Public Administration, meant that I knew
well many of the officials who participated in the
negotiations. These included old colleagues in
External Affairs who worked on Australian affairs in
Wellington or were posted to work in our High
Commission and consulates in Australia. My links
with the leaders of the Treasury, then leading
negotiations through chairmanship of the Officials
Economic Committee, were also helpful to my research
and other activities. Industries and Commerce (later
Trade and Industry) had the closest interaction with
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the manufacturers. Debates on strategy and tactics
with their participants in the negotiations played an
important part in the development of my own thinking
on the issues and how best to deal with them.
I hope that these reflections on my own
involvement in the discussions and debates that led to
CER will provoke some of the officials now in a
position to do so to respond and to tell their part of
what is a fascinating story.
From the time I returned from Britain early in
1958, I was speaking and writing frequently about
our relationship with Australia in a variety of activities
in which I was involved. These included the early
publications of the New Zealand Institute of Economic
Research and the New Zealand Association of
Economists. The issues were debated often at the
meetings of the Economic Society of Australia and
New Zealand, especially in its lively Wellington
branch. I raised them in my presidential address in
1967 to the Economic Section of the Australia New
Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science
(ANZAAS). They featured in several of the continuing
education and Pacific cooperation links that I was
establishing with universities, research institutes and
financial institutions in Australia. In the process, I got
to know several of the Australian officials and others
whose continued positive interest was so important in
eventually achieving a successful outcome.
The case for freeing trade with Australia was an
important aspect of the policy issues featured by two
advisory agencies established by the New Zealand
Government, of which I was made chairman, the
Monetary and Economic Council and the New Zealand
Planning Council. I became heavily involved in the
manufacturing politics of the issues when I worked
for a period as a senior executive of the Tasman Pulp
and Paper Company, which was one of the leading
forest products enterprises involved in the debate.
My various publications and speeches on the issues
from the late 1950s until 1983 are a useful reminder
of the rocky road that had to be travelled before the
CER arrangements were consummated. At a small
private dinner held in Wellington to celebrate the
twentieth anniversary of CER, the leading Australian
negotiator, Doug Anthony, was kind enough to
recognise that my activities during this period had
proved useful to him in sustaining Australian
government interest in bringing the negotiations to a
successful conclusion.
Why Consider Free Trade
with Australia?
At first, it was difficult to provoke interest in the private
sector and the academic community in the possibilities
of freeing trade across the Tasman. Some officials were
interested, but others, reflecting the general attitudes in
the manufacturing sector in particular, were hostile. The
older Sir James Fletcher was among a small number of
industrialists in the late 1950s who favoured the idea of
a form of economic union between Australia and
New Zealand as a reaction to the UK’s expected
association with the EEC.2
While interest in free trade was small, there was
some interest in improving opportunities in one another’s
markets. Trade missions were exchanged between
Australian and New Zealand business people in the late
1950s. Discussions between the two governments,
focused on possible newsprint and other forest
products development, led to the establishment in
1961 of an Australian/New Zealand Consultative
Committee on Trade.
NZIER Discussion Paper No. 1
My arguments for taking freer trade seriously were
summed up in the first discussion paper issued by the
recently created New Zealand Institute of Economic
Research in 1961.3  I pointed out that New Zealand’s
rate of growth had been one of the slowest in the world
in the previous decade. The economy remained
extremely dependent upon a narrow range of export
products, subject to wide fluctuations in price.
Agricultural protectionism in overseas countries clouded
prospects for several products. Government policy had
promoted industrialisation behind the wall of protection,
so that New Zealand might make at home some products
previously imported. Far from reducing the vulnerability
of the economy, industrialisation had so far merely
created a new kind of vulnerability.
The range of New Zealand export products had
scarcely changed. Its imports were in the main now
‘essential’ consumers’ goods and materials or equipment
for its industries and services. Consequently, if exports
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fell, the country was quickly in danger of a contraction
of economic activity and the emergence of unemployment
due to lack of imported supplies, unless there were
adequate reserves of overseas exchange or the country
was able and willing to borrow.
New Zealand’s ability to maintain employment and
improve living standards of what was then a rapidly
growing population continued to depend heavily on its
ability to maintain an adequate increase in the volume of
exports or of the production of efficient domestic
substitutes for goods previously imported. New Zealand’s
dilemma was that the more the process of import
substitution was pushed, behind the wall of protection,
and within the confines of a relatively small market, the
greater were the attendant difficulties. It was more likely
to prejudice the development of its existing export
industries, and of its industries and services generally,
by raising their production costs. It would be driven to
attempt to produce at home more capital goods,
intermediate products such as chemical and
petrochemical products, and components for durable
consumer goods. For those products, because of their
technical complexity, the size of the market was a most
important condition of productivity.
Faced with a similar problem, the Economic
Commission for Latin America had come to an
uncomfortable conclusion:
The continued development of production in
watertight compartments [i.e. within the
confines of the individual national markets]
will steadily widen the gap between the yield
on the new capital investment necessitated by
the march of industrialisation and the results
obtained in great industrial centres with broader
markets at their disposal.
Australia had also adopted protectionist policies.
These were based mainly on relatively high tariffs rather
than the quantitative restrictions that New Zealand had
elected to retain through its import licensing system.
Australia faced less pressing but similar difficulties
to New Zealand’s.
The purpose of the paper I wrote for the Institute was
not to suggest how New Zealand might narrow the large
trade deficit between New Zealand and Australia, which
seemed to preoccupy most of those who bothered to
discuss trans-Tasman trade. Rather it was to examine
possible changes in the trade policies of the two countries
that might improve the efficiency of their economies,
speed up their rates of growth and improve the standards
of living of their growing populations.
Despite the high-sounding objectives of the Canberra
Pact of 1944, there had till then been little real effort to
work closely together in matters of economic
development and trans-Tasman trade. Margins of
preference were tending to decline. Protective duties
and restrictions, and fears that protection might at any
time be increased hampered trade.
I suggested that free trade between Australia New
Zealand could stimulate efficiency through increased
specialisation, economies of scale and increased
competition among producers.
I recognised that there could be some diversion of
imports to more costly Australian sources. Competition
could require changes in the existing structure of industry
and farming. However, the short-term costs involved
were unlikely to be high. The barriers could be eliminated
gradually, overseas investment would be stimulated by
greater efficiency and the capacity of New Zealand to
export to Australia would be increased. I therefore
suggested that there was a prima facie case for increased
specialisation and exchange between Australia and New
Zealand. A partial test could take the form of freeing
trade in some groups of products in the first instance.
The Views of the Monetary and
Economic Council
My colleagues in the Monetary and Economic Council,
established as an ‘economic watchdog’ in 1961, supported
this argument. In our first major report,4 we wrote:
The Council believes that the Government
should explore the possibilities of gradually
establishing a free trade area or Customs
union with Australia ... The opportunities
offered by specialisation to satisfy the
requirements of a larger market, unimpeded
by duties and restrictions, could result in the
long-run in more rapid growth and more
efficient allocation of resources in both
countries to their mutual benefit.
 ips policy paper seventeen •  4
The governments should ensure that the free trade
arrangement included the major products of interest to
each partner, and cooperate in policies designed to
maintain full employment and balanced development
throughout the two countries.
The Council stressed that closer economic union
with Australia by itself would not solve the problems of
industrial development in New Zealand. Effective
planning and macroeconomic policies were vital to
provide a stable and expanding market within which
efficient industries could plan their growth.
The government could and should also help through
taxation changes, education and research services, and
the provision of efficient basic facilities, such as power
and transport.
The next element of the Council’s report was
swimming against the tide of current political and
industrial opinion. It suggested that it was vitally
important to ensure a reasonable degree of competition.
Without that, the spur to reduce costs and improve
productive methods was severely blunted, not only in
secondary industry but in all sections of the economy.
A reasonably competitive market implied that
domestic industry should not be excessively protected
against competition from overseas. In other words, a
policy of gradually freeing trade with Australia should
be seen as a stepping stone to lower protection generally.
Government should certainly use the tariff to support
industries which were reasonably assured of becoming
competitive as they grew in size in an expanding market,
but which were initially handicapped by temporary
obstacles or superficial preferences for imported
products. But it should not shelter very high cost industries
behind a wall of import control, except in very special
circumstances. This was not only unfair to domestic
consumers but also resulted in the absorption of labour,
capital and other resources which could be more fruitfully
employed in other lines of activity.
Government could still accord the degree of
protection it considered desirable to domestic industries
against imports from sources other than Australia. The
advantage would be that it would expose our industries
to greater competition from across the Tasman while at
the same time permitting those industries to compete
more freely on Australia’s wider market. This would
require rationalisation in some sections of New Zealand
industry. This might often result in the creation of larger
productive units. The Council considered that
adjustments of this kind were highly desirable:
Competition between small high-cost
producers, whose share of the market is largely
determined by the allocation of import licences
and who require excessive protection from
imports, has little economic value.
Free trade with Australia should help enable our
industries to compete without the need for high protection.
The Political Scene Pre-NAFTA
Swimming against the tide is an uncomfortable
occupation. There was very little political support for
such ideas in either of the major parties. The ideas
appealed to John Marshall as a long-term vision that
the two countries should ultimately seek to achieve. He
had to face the political reality that the manufacturing
community was almost entirely hostile. Their hostility
was not offset by significant support from farmers or
other sections of the business community.
Officials were also divided. Bill Sutch and others at
the Industries and Commerce Department favoured
continued high protection of domestic industry through
import licensing. I remember my first face-to-face
meeting with Dr Sutch, shortly after I became Macarthy
Professor of Economics at Victoria University in 1959.
He treated me to a scathing criticism of the ministers and
the officials in other departments with whom he had to
deal as Secretary of Industries and Commerce.5  I was
not surprised to learn later that John Marshall had
insisted that he should not continue to be involved in
negotiations on the possibility of freeing trade with
Australia. Jim Moriarty, a former Treasury official who
had become Assistant Secretary of Industries and
Commerce in 1958, and would replace Sutch as Secretary
in 1965, thereafter played an important role in the
developing relationship with Australia.
Sutch’s views on protection and import licensing,
which we shall consider more fully later, remained
important, sometimes as a minority opinion, in the
advice of the Officials Economic Committee to the
Cabinet Economic Committee until 1965. They remained
influential well beyond that with the majority of
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manufacturers, and through them, in the political attitudes
of both National and Labour members of Parliament.
National governments were in office for all but three
years from 1960 until 1984, that is for the period covered
by the negotiations leading up to CER. Although their
political platforms promised more scope for private
enterprise and competition, they were very cautious in
moving towards lower protection and support for
domestic industries.
An increasing number of officials in Foreign Affairs
and the Treasury held similar views to those of the
Monetary and Economic Council. This was reflected
in their advice to successive administrations on the
need for a significant change in New Zealand’s
protection policy.6  Many could see gradual freeing of
trade across the Tasman as a useful stepping stone
towards that objective.
In Australia, the Minister of Trade, John (Black
Jack) McEwen, a rather protectionist Country Party
leader, was among the most sympathetic towards the
idea of a regional association. He believed it was a
strategic necessity for Australia to help bolster the
strength of what he saw as an ailing New Zealand
economy. The close, friendly relationship that he
established with John (Gentleman Jack) Marshall, from
their first meeting at the Consultative Committee on
Trade in February 1961, would play an important part in
getting NAFTA off the ground. Political and official
momentum began to gather in favour of some form of
trans-Tasman trade agreement. But it took over four
years of consultation, discussion and debate to get
agreement on NAFTA.
Negotiations Leading to NAFTA
I wrote an article early in 19657  based on interviews
with Marshall and a variety Australian and New Zealand
officials and business people. I noted that the Ministerial
Meeting of the Australia-New Zealand Consultative
Committee on Trade in April 1963 had initiated a study
of measures that might be adopted to expand trade
between the two countries and check the trend towards
a widening trade gap. In April 1964, an officials
committee from both countries had presented ministers
with a report on the possibilities of freeing trade in forest
products and a number of other items. The Australians
had insisted that it had to cover more than the
‘Forest Products Community’ that New Zealand had
originally proposed.
It seemed to have been accepted from the start that a
comprehensive free trade area was not then practicable,
particularly in regard to ‘sensitive’ commodities.
‘Sensitive’ industries were those that enjoyed substantial
protection or were deemed likely to require protection
in the national interest. Most of the commodities
accepted for study already entered the importing
country free of duty.
The very cautious approach to what products should
be included had been supplemented by great care in
providing safeguards against serious injury to industries
whose products were included. Despite such safeguards,
the New Zealand government had felt it desirable before
proceeding further to engage in a prolonged series of
discussions with manufacturers. That was the main
reason why further progress had not been made. Many
important problems had been left unresolved or partially
resolved. The main ones were the extent of the list of
commodities to be included; the provisions to be made
for extension of free trade treatment to commodities not
originally included; and, most particularly, what
obligations each partner should undertake in relation to
quantitative import restrictions.
GATT obligations were given scant attention. Our
negotiators were inclined to emphasise the extent to
which the benefits that exporters of temperate foodstuffs
might have expected from GATT had been frustrated by
the protective barriers of industrial countries. They
seemed to believe that they could expect sympathy both
on this ground and on the ground of differences in the
degree of industrial development between Australia and
New Zealand and the large imbalance of trade between
the two countries.
They were partially right. I had been surprised how
much sympathy there was for this last line of argument
by several people to whom I had spoken in Australia. It
seemed to be accepted there that the agreement had to
make a contribution to redressing the adverse balance of
trade and to avoid prejudicing New Zealand’s industrial
development programme.
The Australians hoped that as many goods as possible
would be freed from import controls. But many of them
had been prepared to accept that it would not be
practicable to allow unrestricted as well as duty-free
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entry to all scheduled goods from Australia. They were
unlikely to press for provisions that threatened to
undermine the effectiveness of controls applied,
consistent with our international obligations, to protect
the balance of payments. The basis existed for a certainly
limited, but worthwhile, arrangement between the two
countries that would contribute to New Zealand’s primary
objective of strengthening the competitive position of
the forest products industries.
I thought that the Australians were also ready to
consider very seriously an extension of the free trade
schedule to include other products of interest to New
Zealand exporters. These could include frozen foods,
aluminium, carpets and chinaware, and even lamb and
pigmeats, as part of an endeavour to bring the initial
commodity coverage up to a more acceptable level. It
seemed that the ‘price’ to be paid for such extension
would not be set too high.
The New Zealand government remained very
sensitive to the negative, and sometimes hostile, attitude
that many manufacturers, and their trade associations,
had taken to the proposals being discussed. The extent
of their concern was surprising, given that the proposals
were limited in coverage, excluded all the most sensitive
industries, and were full of safeguards both for existing
industries and for New Zealand’s future industrial
development.
The Australians were assuming that this was the
beginning, not the end of the road to more positive
cooperation. They thought such cooperation was
increasingly important on political and strategic, as well
as economic, grounds. Most Australians were much
more aware than most New Zealanders of dangers
looming to the north and of relative strategic isolation.
Like John McEwen, they saw positive cooperation by
the two countries to build up their military and economic
strength as an increasingly important objective.
The continued reduction of barriers to trade was only
one of the requirements for achieving such an objective.
I contended that one major objective was more positive
action by the New Zealand government to improve the
competitive position of New Zealand manufacturing:
Anyone observing the course of the free trade
negotiations must surely be deeply concerned
at how few New Zealand manufacturers are
positively interested in gaining freer access to
the market and how many are pathologically
afraid of the possibility, however remote, of
more active competition from Australia. If, as
we hope, New Zealand manufacturing is to
make a positive contribution to exchange-
earning as well as to exchange-saving, this is a
situation which calls for urgent remedy.8
While the remedy was mainly in our own hands,
more cooperation with Australia over a wide front could
assist greatly in applying it. I hoped that “unreasonable
fears and suspicions by some New Zealand
manufacturers” would not be allowed to prejudice
the possibility of constructive developments along
those lines.
Comments on the Outcome of the
NAFTA Negotiations
The editorial in the New Zealand Economist and
Taxpayer on 1 September 1965 was headed ‘More
Cheers for Mr Marshall’. At the time, Bryan Philpott,
Norman Macbeth and I were shareholder/directors of
this journal. We assisted in dealing with its somewhat
precarious financial position by writing articles,
contributing to a monthly column under the name
Tancredo, or assisting with editorials, with payment
in shares. I believe that I had a large part in preparing
this editorial.
John Marshall had made a statement to Parliament
on the results of his negotiations with John McEwen in
July 1965 to complete NAFTA. The editorial suggested
that he had come back with a very satisfactory answer to
those who had cast doubt on his capacity to negotiate
with the Australians.
The Australians had agreed to include not only
almost all forest products but also lamb and cheese
(subject to quota). Frozen and dried vegetables were
also included. The statement indicated that, right to the
end, consultations had continued with New Zealand
manufacturers. After a discussion by Marshall with the
Federation on 19 August, New Zealand had been
permitted to withdraw from the schedule items which
“could have been damaging to New Zealand industries”.
The right to impose import controls had been retained
along with the normal safeguards against dumping and
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subsidised exporting. Withdrawal of scheduled items
was permitted if that was deemed necessary in the
interests of economic development or to prevent serious
injury to producers.
It was significant that the manufacturers’ officials
should say that “the agreement negotiated by Mr Marshall
is better than we had hoped and not as bad as we had
feared”. For his part, John Marshall thanked the
manufacturers for helping him to negotiate such a
favourable arrangement by being “so unreasonable, pig-
headed and obstructive”.9
The main disadvantages of the agreement stemmed
from the caution of the governments. “The agreement
could be made meaningless if the two governments were
to resort to these safeguards indiscriminately.” The
governments should recognise that, when competition
from across the Tasman began to ‘bite’, this, along with
the increasing opportunities to export, was one of the
positive merits of the agreement. It should increase the
pressure on domestic industry to improve its efficiency
and hold down its cost of production.
Government should not ignore the complaints of
industries that encountered difficulties. It should examine
very seriously the possibility of removing any
disadvantages arising from differences in company tax,
subsidisation of transport costs, availability of materials
and equipment because of import licensing, and so on.
The editorial was disappointed that so little had been
said of exploring the possibilities of carrying cooperation
further. The establishment of a joint consultative council
on forest products was worthwhile. However, it would
have been better if the governments had established a
joint secretariat responsible for reporting on what further
extensions might be made to the mutual advantage of
both countries. These included arrangements for joint
action on defence, foreign aid, defence supplies, tourism,
transport, marketing and the raising of capital for
development, for example, to help both countries to
make the best use of their resources. Such an institution
would have served as an indication to other members of
GATT that the parties were serious in the aim of carrying
integration as far as it was mutually beneficial to do so.
I was able to summarise the outcome of the NAFTA
negotiations concluded on 31 August 1965 in discussion
paper No. 10 of the Institute of Economic Research .10
The analysis indicated that New Zealand had gained a
good deal more than she had conceded, at least in the
short run. Australia had not gained much immediate
improvement in access to the New Zealand market, but
rather the consolidation, with slight improvements, of
the present position. The prospect of further progress
was not at all clearly defined and depended on regular
reviews of the agreement and how New Zealand
administered the import licensing regulations.
The fears of adverse effects expressed by certain
New Zealand groups had proved to be grossly overstated.
In the short run at least, New Zealand manufacturers had
not been exposed to any significant increase in
competition from Australia. Abundant safeguards had
been provided to offset any effects deemed to be contrary
to the national interest. The Australians had obviously
accepted that sensitivity to the manufacturers’ fears was
politically important in New Zealand.
Nevertheless I accepted that, if one viewed the
arrangements as the beginning of a road of cooperative
action to further the development of the two countries,
it could be regarded as a document of considerable
political and economic significance.
I summed up the prevailing political atmosphere in
a later article in the following terms:
It was somewhat surprising, politically, that a
New Zealand Government should enter into an
arrangement like NAFTA in 1966. There was
no significant pressure group advocating such
a development, only a few economists and
industrialists, and the Monetary and Economic
Council. The Labour movement and most
manufacturers were positively hostile, even to
the extremely cautious Agreement which
emerged. By accepting the Agreement, each
Government made a partial acknowledgement
that cooperation and mutual reduction of trade
barriers might be more fruitful than pursuing
development behind separate walls of
protection. Sensitive to the pressures of interests
enjoying high protection in their economies,
however, each Government clearly preferred
to adopt a pragmatic, ad hoc approach to
achieving the objectives. The initial list of
products – Schedule A – to be exposed to free
trade was severely limited, and hedged around
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with numerous safeguard clauses. Important
New Zealand rural exports, such as cheese and
lamb, were made subject to quota, and important
Australian manufactured exports, like motor
vehicles and iron and steel, were excluded.
There was no plan or timetable for additions to
be made to the list.11
The Academic Debate
In the latter part of the 1967 discussion paper, I discussed
the major fear of many in New Zealand that the benefit
of completely free trade would accrue almost entirely
to Australia. That fear had been stimulated by
publications of the Canterbury University economist,
Wolfgang Rosenberg, and by Dr Sutch. They were both
strong supporters of the retention of protection by import
licensing. They rightly saw the freeing of trade across
the Tasman as a threat to its continuation.
Sutch advocated the development of secondary
industry as a counter to ‘colonial dependence’, as a
means of dealing with an intractable deficit in the
balance of payments, and to ensure employment for a
growing work force. Ideologically he found dependence
on Britain demeaning, even at an earlier time when it
enabled the country to sustain the third highest standard
of living in the world.
In the 1960s, we shared the view that New Zealand
could not continue to rely so heavily on the narrow basis
of pastoral exports to Britain. I agreed with most of what
he had to say about the need to improve education, the
arts, industrial design, town planning and infrastructure
in New Zealand. We both wanted to see the development
of a wider range of industries that could both export and
make efficiently in New Zealand things that we would
otherwise have to import. Where we differed was on the
best means of encouraging such development.
Bill Sutch believed strongly in selective,
administrative regulation of imports as a basis for
planning the necessary restructuring. Wolfgang
Rosenberg shared most of his views. He put additional
emphasis on the need for administrative restrictions to
prevent the excessive importing that he believed full
employment in New Zealand must necessarily entail.
I favoured a more market-oriented approach to the
support of industry in the restructuring process. I regarded
import licensing as inefficient and ineffective, both in
curbing total imports and allocating the available overseas
exchange to best effect. I also believed the gradual
exposure of New Zealand manufacturing to greater
competition, in the context of a regional arrangement
with Australia, would facilitate the development of its
capacity to compete more widely. An attack on excessive
protection through import licensing was an essential
element of the economic reforms I believed the
country required.
Particularly during the period when NAFTA was
being negotiated, similar debates were occurring among
officials in the government, notably between Industries
and Commerce on the one hand and the Treasury and
External Affairs on the other. Although the differences
became less pronounced after Sutch left in 1965,
Industries and Commerce continued to reflect more
closely the views of the manufacturing industry in
favour of continued administrative protection. In doing
so, they were of course implementing decisions by
successive governments to retain import licensing. They
were also reflecting the general attitudes of the ministers
who were appointed to that portfolio, such as Warren
Freer in the Labour government and Lance Adams-
Schneider in the Muldoon administration.
In 1973, with the economy riding high, and the
Labour government beginning to take a more liberal
attitude towards importing, Henry Lang, as Secretary to
Treasury, spoke out more strongly than was normal for
a government official on what he saw as appropriate
policies for growth and structural change. This reflected
the directions which thinking about trade with Australia
had taken in the Treasury and in External Affairs
throughout the 1960s:
We should be more consciously aiming to
create an open, adaptable economy, based on
natural advantages and talents. We are some
distance from that objective at the present time.
Despite great advances in exports of
manufactured goods over recent years, many
of our industries are still micro-copies of the
industries of the large industrial countries in
both structure and techniques. That is a direct
result of excessive protection and is in my view
inappropriate to New Zealand conditions. We
have much still to do to shape our industrial
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sector to our own individual strengths. I believe
that a pre-requisite to the fulfilment of our
foreign policy goals, is the implementation of
effective innovative industrial policies,
embracing market research, technology, fiscal
incentives, tariff reforms, adjustment assistance
for firms and industries, and active labour
market policy ...
As a broad objective of foreign and
economic policy, promoting both growth and
independence, this prescription will meet with
little quarrel. However, when it comes to the
question of methods and some of the basic
implications, such as the pattern of employment,
then the voices of dissent will certainly be
heard. There are those who believe that we
need high and continuous protection for
industrial development and the maintenance of
full employment. Many people who hold such
views are also opposed to a more open economy
generally, to membership of multinational
organisations and foreign investment. In essence
they believe the right policy for us is a kind of
‘Fortress New Zealand’. And this best fits our
national aspirations. While such a policy is
tenable it is inconsistent with the kind of foreign
policy I have discussed earlier, and is also
inconsistent with reasonable economic growth.
I believe that the fears expressed by some
manufacturers and trade unions at the prospect
of the move towards a more open economy are
exaggerated and underestimate the basic
strengths of large sections of our industry.12
Opponents of freeing trade in an orthodox manner
found some support from a Hungarian economist who
had emigrated to New Zealand to work at NZIER, Peter
Elkan.13  Peter was strongly in favour of more extensive
freeing of trade with Australia than had been arranged
up till then, but he argued that the freeing should take
place in the context of what he called a “customs
drawback union”.
He had an ingenious scheme designed to ensure that
reciprocity would be achieved in each of a number of
categories into which items traded between the two
countries would be classified. He described his scheme
as “balanced free trade in compartments”. This would be
designed to eliminate New Zealand’s trade deficit with
Australia. He claimed that it would raise the volume of
trade between the two countries but prevent undesirable
types of international specialisation. By this he meant
any contraction of the New Zealand manufacturing
sector, and the “polarisation” of industrial activity in
“nodal centres” like Sydney and Melbourne.
I argued that New Zealand would not enter any free
trade arrangement as an irrevocably poor,
underdeveloped rural region. It already had a high per
capita income, giving it great capacity for saving and
investment. It had a wide range of growing manufacturing
enterprises already in existence, with scope for
considerable improvements in productivity, especially
if they had access to a wide market. It had a skilled labour
force, whose skills could be further improved by
development of its education and extension services.
Moreover, New Zealand would retain its own
government, which could give and would be induced by
the agreement to give considerable assistance to industry
by methods which would have more positive effects
than protection in helping industry to improve its
efficiency. These points suggested that the fears of
the effects of freeing trade between the two countries
were overstated.
So long as each country could sustain a satisfactory
rate of development and employment and reasonable
balance of payments overall, there seemed no economic
justification for aiming at balance of trade between
Australia and New Zealand. Both of them would continue
in the foreseeable future to conduct most of their trade
with other countries.
In particular, there seemed no justification for
aiming at balance in particular categories of goods. One
of the countries might be quite unsuited to produce
some of such goods, not only now but also in
foreseeable future circumstances. On the other hand, it
might have and be likely to retain a substantial
comparative advantage in producing other types of
goods. The customs drawback scheme would involve
undesirable elements of rigidity in this respect. It would
also introduce complications and uncertainties into
trading relationships that it would be better to avoid.
For those reasons, I suggested that if Mr Elkan’s
scheme was used, it should be as a basis to help foster
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rationalisation in a few selected industries, for example,
floor coverings, footwear or motor vehicle components.
It should not be the fundamental basis for the freeing of
trade between the two countries.
New Zealand needed to consider very seriously
whether the negative and restrictive attitude which was
generally taken in the country to freeing trade with
Australia was really in the country’s own interests. It
was based on the Sutch and Rosenberg assumption that
heavy protection was a major prerequisite for adequate
industrial development and full employment. We needed
an increasing contribution from manufacturers to earning
extra overseas exchange required for equipment,
materials and essential consumers goods that could not
economically be made in New Zealand. But if a significant
number of industries could not be developed over a
period of years to the point where they could hold their
own in free competition with Australian manufacturers,
what hope was there that they would earn increasing
supplies of overseas exchange for the country? What
hope was there that they would be able to sell over a tariff
wall in Australia, let alone in competition with Australian
and other manufacturers in alternative markets? What
hope was there that they would be able to meet this
country’s requirements at reasonable costs and prices?
The review by Professor McDougall explored in
considerable technical detail Peter Elkan’s arguments
and reached similar conclusions to my own.14  He also
shared my concerns about the gradual approach to
integration taken by the governments. McDougall
emphasised the need for much more work than I had
done on intensive industry studies to assess both the type
and extent of potential scale economies in different
industries and the reasons for differences in productivity
among them. He generally agreed with my analysis and
policy recommendations.
We both considered that New Zealand’s currency
was pegged at an unduly high level at the time and
would need to be devalued as a precondition for any
extensive freeing of trade. (This happened not too long
afterwards in 1967.)
Not many Australian academics became involved in
the debate on NAFTA. A significant exception was my
former student and colleague, attracted away to a very
desirable post at ANU, Peter Lloyd.15  He was making an
international reputation for his work on trade and trade
policy. We differed to some extent on tactics and on how
much ‘harmonisation’ of policy was needed. But his
views on the desirability of integration between the two
countries were generally similar to mine.
Tasman and Manufacturing Politics
In September 1967, I surprised friends and colleagues
by resigning my chair at VUW to become Economics
Manager of the Tasman Pulp and Paper Company in
Kawerau. On about the same day as I arrived, the
Managing Director of the company, Geoff Schmitt,
gave notice that he would resign at the end of the year.
Geoff had head-hunted me to assist his management
team to carry forward ambitious plans to undertake a
major expansion at Tasman which would produce
linerboard for the Australia-New Zealand market. He
was relying heavily on being permitted, indeed
encouraged, to take advantage of the provisions of
NAFTA, by competing without any official
impediment for the available business in that segment
of the market.
Schmitt had played an important part, working with
New Zealand officials, such as Jim Moriarty of
Industries and Commerce and Lindsay Poole of the
Forest Service, and Alan Westerman, a leading trade
official in Australia, in encouraging and assisting the
two governments to make the agreement. One of the
accepted major aims was to enable New Zealand to
improve its economy and balance of payments by
developing exports of forest products.
Geoff Schmitt completed a memoir before he died
in 2003 of his experiences in the early years of Tasman.16
He published this privately and restricted its circulation
to a few people on the understanding that it would not
be made available more widely until after his death.
The memoir contains a fascinating account of the
tortuous negotiations involved in getting NAFTA off
the ground. Tasman was one of the few New Zealand
enterprises that had any enthusiasm for the gradual
freeing of trade with Australia. Even in forest products,
the largest company, NZ Forest Products, still had
plant operating on a relatively small and uncompetitive
scale. It therefore still relied heavily on protection
against imports from Canada and Scandinavia. Its
concept of forest products trade under NAFTA, at least
in the short term, was ‘free trade one-way’.
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Schmitt shows that Trade Minister John Marshall
and New Zealand officials supported Tasman’s initial
proposal to expand in linerboard. It would cater for the
most rapidly developing part of the Australian market
for forest products. It was a more profitable means, for
both the Company and New Zealand, of using the
volume and type of wood available than expansion in
pulp or newsprint would have been.
Political pressures on both sides of the Tasman
against the linerboard proposal began to undermine
Schmitt’s expansion plans in 1967. Trans-Tasman
ministerial meetings resulted in the companies in the
forest products sector being advised to resolve their
differences by consultation and cooperation, rather than
to compete for the available market.
Schmitt already faced some problems arising from
this philosophy. His competitive position in newsprint
and pulp had not been enhanced when the Australian
newspaper publishers, owners of Australian Newsprint
Mills (ANM), had been invited to become shareholders
of Tasman (in addition to the New Zealand Government,
Fletchers, Bowaters and Reeds). He was unhappy when
his chairman, no doubt responding to the governments’
pressure, began to intervene in the negotiating process
with APM on linerboard. He was reluctant to agree to
move in the direction of a collusive agreement with
APM and some form of joint holding company or
merger with NZ Forest Products.
At about the same time, he was forced to defend his
management team against what he considered to be an
unprofessional and unfair critical report on Tasman’s
operations by a visiting mission. After visiting Bowaters
to discuss these issues in September 1967, he felt obliged
to tender his resignation.
My appointment went ahead, but in circumstances
very different from those Schmitt and I had envisaged.
My duties gave me insights into the workings of NAFTA,
and the forces impinging on it, from a very different
perspective from that of my former academic and public
advisory roles.
The Tasman board did not take long to abandon the
linerboard proposal. With ministers having insisted on a
cooperative approach, Tasman had to make alternative
plans for expansion in pulp and newsprint. One of my
early duties was to be sent solo to restore diplomatic
relations with the leading Australian manufacturer of
packaging materials, APM. APM had given notice of its
intention to terminate its pulp contract with Tasman
when it expired. It had cut back purchases to the minimum
contract quantities. APM’s managing director, John
Wilson, made me welcome and showed readiness to
cooperate in a program to take expanded volumes of
New Zealand pulp.
Later with Maurie Kjar, Tasman’s commercial
manager, I was involved in negotiating contracts with
APM and other Australian companies which would
supply the bulk of the market for the pulp element of
Tasman’s next major expansion. I was not involved in
the negotiation of the newsprint contracts, which were
regarded as the preserve of Bowaters.
Ministers meeting in Canberra in April 1968 agreed
Australia should accord New Zealand pulp a preferred
position in the Australian market. The Australian
government referred the issue to the Tariff Board. It
requested the Board to recommend what tariff and/or
other measures should be applied to imports of pulp
from other sources to ensure that import requirements
were met first by suitable pulp of New Zealand origin. A
condition was that the pulp should be available on terms
and conditions no less favourable than those on which
pulp was available under normal trading conditions
from other sources.
I was asked to lead submissions to the Tariff Board
on behalf of Tasman, NZ Forest Products and Caxton. I
had a strong supporting cast from the three companies.
The Board recommended, and the Australian
Government later agreed, that specified softwood pulps
be made dutiable at a rate of 20%. However, provisions
were made for by-law admission for importers to avoid
this duty if New Zealand pulp was not available on
suitable terms, or if the Minister was satisfied importers
would voluntarily undertake to import adequate volumes
from New Zealand.
One of my other responsibilities was to represent
Tasman at meetings of the Auckland Manufacturers’
Association (the most protectionist of the associations at
the time), and at the New Zealand Manufacturers’
Federation. I was normally in a small minority when
issues of protection arose.
At the 1968 annual meeting of the Federation, the
Canterbury Association put forward a motion that
represented some weakening of the normal Federation
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line on retention of import licensing. This was badly
received, especially by many Auckland members.
Overnight, they prevailed on Canterbury to agree to
withdraw the motion. A few of us considered that the
opinion of the Federation as a whole on the issue should
be tested. We successfully argued that the Canterbury
motion be put to the vote. This caused considerable
consternation, especially as there were some doubts as
to how many from each Association were entitled to
vote. Once this was settled, the Auckland delegation
ensured that members of their team, like Jim Doig of
UEB, who were attracted to the Canterbury motion,
would not be chosen as representatives for voting
purposes. The motion was resoundingly lost.
I also represented Tasman at the Forestry
Development Conference. I was elected chairman of the
Forest Industries Working Party. The FTC became part
of the broader National Development Conference held
in 1969. The issue of the means of protection and
support of industry, so relevant to the progress of NAFTA,
became a prominent and contentious issue at the
conferences.
In his Economic Review for 1969, Mr Muldoon, as
Minister of Finance, summed up what he described as
the highlights of the conference decisions and
discussions. Among these was the following summary
of resolution 209A:
Industrial policy should be aimed at encouraging
the establishment and expansion of growth
industries. More mature and rational criteria
for industrial development and for protection
of local industry need to be introduced. It was
widely accepted that, over a period, the import
licensing system with its built-in rigidity should
be generally replaced by the more flexible
instrument of tariff protection. New concepts
in industrial policy including methods of tariff
setting should be investigated urgently.17
The National Party decided to adopt this approach
as policy for the 1972 election. The manufacturers and
the unions organised a vociferous campaign against it.
Leading members of the National Party considered that
their adoption of this policy was one of the main
reasons why they lost that election. This attitude
coloured their views on trade policy and on negotiation
under NAFTA throughout the Muldoon administration
elected in 1975.
NAFTA in the Early Seventies
I returned to VUW in 1970 to a new Chair of Money
and Finance. I continued ‘networking’ on issues of trans-
Tasman trade individually, through the MEC and NZPC
and various continuing education activities. I also
cooperated closely with Bill Scollay, John Utz and others
in their efforts to establish a broadly based ANZ
Businessmen’s (sic) Council
In an article published in the Bank of New South
Wales Review late in 1973, I reviewed developments
under the Agreement in its first few years of operation.
Exports to Australia had risen from $NZ 35 million to
$NZ 131 million. New Zealand had doubled its share of
the Australian import market.
Commenting on statistics of the development of
trade across the Tasman from 1964-65 to 1972-73, the
article18  noted that the proportion of New Zealand
exports going to Australia still represented only about
3% of Australia’s imports. Australia was supplying a
rising proportion of New Zealand’s import market.
However, the percentage of New Zealand’s imports
from Australia included in Schedule A, while growing,
was still less than 50%.
The percentage of Australia’s imports from New
Zealand in Schedule A has steadily and appreciably
declined. Some improvement was expected as major
new projects in the New Zealand pulp and paper industry
found significant export outlets in Australia.
Nevertheless, Schedule A remained relatively limited
in its product coverage. Expansion of trade between
the two countries owed much more to other factors
than to the reduction or elimination of duties under
the Agreement.
The direct contribution of the Agreement to trade
expansion had been disappointing, even when one took
account of special arrangements made under Article 3:7
of the Agreement. Article 3:7 arrangements usually
involved duty concessions by Australia in return for
provision of extra import licences by New Zealand.
They had resulted in two-way trade totalling $58 million
from their inception in 1967 until March 1973. The
Agreement had certainly led to much greater contact and
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consultation among industrialists, traders and
government officials in the two countries, from which
some of the expansion of trade had flowed. It had also
helped to improve the climate for cooperation in both the
public and private sectors by comparison with the
unfortunate bickering that often previously prevailed in
trans-Tasman trading relationships. But, it said, “the
ritual satisfaction expressed by governments each year
after consultations under the Agreement has recently
given way to recognition that the progress made in
achieving the objectives of NAFTA has in fact been
disturbingly slow”.19
Several factors explained the slow progress. The
agreement itself left the timing of reductions in trade
barriers entirely to the discretion of the governments.
The philosophy underlying the Agreement that its
operation should not significantly damage existing
industries in either country had continued to prevail, and
been rather rigidly interpreted by governments, both in
nominating and accepting additions to Schedule A.
The fact that Australia imposed duties on several
materials and components which New Zealand admitted
duty-free, had caused resistance by Australian producers
to freeing imports of finished goods in which they are
embodied. So had New Zealand’s continuing resort to
import licensing.
With governments relying heavily on the advice of
domestic industries in what they were prepared to do,
progress had rested heavily on the willingness of
protected industries to expose themselves to greater
competition. In an attempt to reduce this problem, there
had been somewhat more nominations for inclusion by
government rather than industry, especially by New
Zealand’s. In 1972, the joint working party of officials
had explored an industry-by-industry rather than item-
by-item approach to adding goods to Schedule A.
However, only a very small part of the range of goods
produced by the four industries involved (glass and
glassware, furniture, biscuits and bakery, and sporting
goods) was included in the Schedule issued in
July 1973.20
I was able to report more positive attitudes to NAFTA
by both the government, which by then was the Labour
party under Norman Kirk, and by the Manufacturers’
Federation. Mr Kirk had dubbed the agreement an
outstanding success. Fred Turnovsky, the President of
the Federation, acknowledged that New Zealand’s
industrialists had generally viewed NAFTA with
suspicion in its early years, but he believed that they had
now “moved towards a recognition that NAFTA has a
positive and dynamic role to play in the future”. However,
the address21 in which he made this comment made it
clear that he was not speaking of the kind of free trade
agreement that I was advocating.
Rather he favoured a continuation of gradual
negotiated progress, with industry agreement. The
Federation had put forward the idea of ‘conditional
listing’ on schedule A as an inducement to more
manufacturers to try out exposure to more competition
without irrevocably committing themselves to the
concept. Apparently, they did not believe that they could
rely on using the extensive safeguards already built into
NAFTA. Turnovsky quoted with approval the approach
agreed by the Australian and New Zealand Labour
Ministers of Trade that NAFTA should be used as a basis
for developing complementary use of resources and that
the two countries could possibly use special measures to
protect one another’s production. He saw great scope for
Australia to replace the United Kingdom as a source of
New Zealand imports as the latter joined the European
Economic Community and preferences were phased
out. The emphasis was still on voluntary cooperation
between industry groups, with government
encouragement and support.
Advice to adopt a timetable and schedule for a
gradual approach to freeing trade in substantially all
products had still not commended itself to government
or industry in either country. The Minister of Overseas
Trade in Australia, Dr Cairns, and New Zealand’s
Minister of Trade and Industry, Mr Freer, had agreed
that the activities of manufacturers on both sides of the
Tasman must be coordinated through better inter-industry
liaison. The manufacturers’ bodies had reacted by
establishing industry panels in respect of several products
to consider the basis of access to each other’s markets,
complementary industrial development, cooperation and
development of other markets, and problems relating to
the source of raw materials.
I summed up by saying that current governmental
and private attitudes seemed well-disposed towards
faster progress under NAFTA than had taken place in
the past. I suggested they would be even better if the
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governments were prepared to show the political will to
devise self-executing provisions, subject to exceptions
and safeguards, which would reach the goal of freeing
substantially all the trade between the NAFTA partners
within a defined period of time. The article suggested
the establishment of a small independent advisory
agency charged with the task of advising the
government and public and the two countries on
measures to be taken jointly and severally to achieve
NAFTA’s objectives.
However, governments had not seen the need for
this sort of approach. And the New Zealand Labour
Government’s willingness to reduce import licensing
protection had evaporated as the balance of payments
deficit blew out through high spending and the effects
of the first oil crisis.
Hardening Australian Attitudes
1977-78
I paid a visit to Canberra on 23-24 May 1977 to have
discussions with ministers, officials and academics,
primarily on trans-Tasman relations.22
Australian ministers and officials had become
increasingly concerned about the current state and
future prospects of Australian manufacturing industries.
Growing mineral exports had driven up the value of the
Australian dollar. The ‘Gregory thesis’ suggested that
this would remain a serious problem for other export
industries, notably manufacturing, in the longer term.
A White Paper on manufacturing was being written on
how these problems should be approached in policy.
Some ministers and departments were giving serious
consideration to the reintroduction of quantitative
restrictions in some areas, particularly on labour-
intensive manufactures such as textiles and clothing.
Bill McKinnon, then the Chairman of the Industries
Assistance Commission, summed up the views of
several officials I met when he said that the rapid
development of manufacturing in New Zealand,
specifically designed to take advantage of Australian
protection in those areas, was exercising the minds of
ministers and officials. There had been increasingly
vocal complaints from Australian manufacturers
about lower input costs enjoyed by New Zealand
competitors because of the different tariff structures in
New Zealand.
Several officials sympathetic to acceleration of
the freeing of trade across the Tasman felt that this
problem should be addressed by working towards a
customs union. The negotiation of a common external
tariff would be a two-way process, said one official,
with some of Australia’s rates on raw materials moving
down to New Zealand rates and some New Zealand
rates moving up to Australia’s.
Pressures coming from ASEAN for improved
access into the Australian market were becoming of
increasing concern. In Mr McKinnon’s view, most
politicians had vastly overestimated the effect on the
employment situation of the 25% tariff cut that the
Whitlam government had made. There was a tendency
for ministers to lose their nerve. “We are not really
winning against the protectionists.”
At a dinner meeting of the Pacific Institute in
Melbourne, the Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm
Fraser, was quoted by our Consul General as saying
“despite our requests for restraint, New Zealand has
persisted in flooding the market with directly
competitive goods. Several Australian companies have
been forced into bankruptcy and hundreds of people
have been put out of work as a result”. He went on to
claim that “the New Zealanders” had taken “unfair
advantage of our leniency towards them in the past.
To make matters worse their idea of access for
Australian goods is to reduce tariffs on one hand but
to keep out our manufacturers with their quotas on the
other. They have not played the game”.
He suggested that “the New Zealanders got quite
shocked the other day when Doug Anthony and Bob
Cotton went over there and announced that we had
had enough; that from now on New Zealand goods
entering Australia would be subject to quotas the
same as goods from anywhere else. We cannot have
countries exploiting a preferred position on the
Australian market but keeping Australian goods out
of their own market”.
Others interviewed claimed that the temporary
difficulties being faced by Australia were making it
very difficult for politicians to take the sorts of
initiatives required in the Australia/New Zealand
relationship. Nevertheless, there was a much greater
recognition by ministers of the need to develop and
enhance that relationship than there had been 20 years
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before. I asked some officials what would be the
reaction within Australia if New Zealand proposed a
radical step forward in the NAFTA. Most felt that this
had not been regarded as a serious prospect, but there
could be merit in floating the idea, particularly within
academic circles.
Some emphasised that NAFTA did not stir the
attention of Australian ministers. This was simply a
question of the relative importance of the agreement
to each country’s total economic circumstances. Most
officials appreciated that the problems of Australian
manufacturing were not really the result of New
Zealand import penetration. As one put it, “the basic
problem is that Australia has priced itself out of
world markets”.
The New Zealand High Commission, in a detailed
paper on trends in Australian protection policy in
June 1977, had emphasised indications that attitudes
to New Zealand and the NAFTA in some ministerial
and official quarters had hardened during the life of
the current government. Ministers like Doug Anthony
and Bob Cotton had made statements that reflected an
apparently consistent view that Australia was not
getting what it would regard as a fair deal out of
NAFTA. New Zealand could not rely on appeals to
our “special trading relationship” to carry all that
much weight.
Yet Mr Anthony’s occasional public and private
references to the possibility of forming a customs
union suggested that he for one still saw the
Australia/New Zealand economic relationship as a
key factor. There was a very good understanding of
the potential benefits for Australia at senior official
level. The desire of Australia and New Zealand to
develop an increasingly efficient, export-oriented
industrial sector had always been an underlying
rationale for the NAFTA.
When the renewal of the NAFTA had come before
the Australian Cabinet in 1976, it had developed
enough momentum to proceed. It was therefore
renewed for a further 10 years. But the New Zealand
High Commission felt obliged seriously to ask whether
recent political and economic developments could be
leading the Australians in the direction of allowing
the NAFTA to atrophy. Against this New Zealand
remained Australia’s main export market, indeed
almost its only major market for manufactures.
Manufacturing industries with the service industries
were the great employers. As the White Paper
remarked, “manufacturing retains its central
importance in Australia’s economic structure”.
Evidence to the Crawford
Group 1978
I visited Canberra again in July 1978 to give evidence, as
Chairman of the New Zealand Planning Council, to a
Study Group on Structural Adjustment that the Australian
government had established under the chairmanship of
the distinguished public servant and academic, Sir John
Crawford. One of its members was Bob Hawke, then
President of the Australian Council of Trade Unions.
In introducing my submission to the Crawford Study
Group,23  I drew their attention to an agreement made
between the Prime Ministers in March 1978 that:
In considering questions of assistance for the
development of particular industries in which
the other country would have an interest, each
government should take into account the situation
and prospects for the industries concerned in the
other country. The consultative mechanisms
should be established to make possible
consultation between governments before
decisions are taken on these questions …
I argued that relations with New Zealand fell within
the terms of reference of the Study Group, especially as
New Zealand provided the largest single market for
Australia’s exports of manufactures. I told them that, after
discussions with the Australian government, the New
Zealand government had suggested to me that the Group
might find it useful to receive, from a New Zealand
source, a submission on Australian relationships with
New Zealand.
I saw the main purpose of strengthening the bilateral
relationship to be to help both countries to cope effectively
with the challenges of external political and economic
forces in which they had a mutual interest.
I quoted Alan & Robin Burnett on ‘The Australian and
New Zealand Nexus’ as 
… a mixture of a common heritage in the
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British Empire and Commonwealth, geographic
proximity in the South Pacific, a tradition of
allowing movement of people between the two
countries with a minimum of restriction, a
close military association embodied in the word
Anzac and a highly preferential trading
relationship. While each country has developed
a distinctive national spirit people speak with
similar accents and share similar cultures.
The Planning Council saw the development of much
closer relationships between Australia and New Zealand
as a most important element of any strategy designed to
increase our general efficiency. I suggested that similar
political, strategic and economic pressures confronted
New Zealand and Australia. The Council had therefore
concluded that a central aim of external policy should be
to give new impetus to trans-Tasman cooperation. This
could extend beyond trade and defence to external
marketing and tourist development, to social and cultural
projects, and programmes of overseas assistance.
Progress was being made towards greater integration of
defence effort and interchange on policy issues of mutual
interest. I registered concern at the lack of progress
towards the original aims of NAFTA.
The Council had recommended that serious
consideration be given to the possibility of eliminating
most barriers to trade between the two countries over a
period of 10 or 15 years. We had acknowledged that a
list of exceptions might be necessary to deal with cases
of special difficulty on each side, but contended that
such a list should be small.
The suggestion for close cooperation and freer trade
across the Tasman was not put forward as a means of
insulating the countries from the rest of the world. Our
philosophy was in tune with that expressed by Sir John
Crawford in a recent lecture. He had noted how
protectionist both Australia and New Zealand had been
in respect of finished manufactured goods. He had
drawn attention to the interactions between high
protection and inflation. He had commented that the
brave new world of the post-war era ushered in by
GATT, IMF and other ventures in international
cooperation was under great stress.
Sir John had recognised that economic conditions in
Australia, particularly high inflation and high
unemployment, were making it difficult to respond
adequately. He saw this as no excuse for evading the
issue of restructuring the Australian economy. There
needed to be considerable change in the structure of
industries and away from highly protective import
substitution policies. The compass was set for freer
trade. Australia would need a gyroscope to steady
the path as many cross currents, even gale force winds,
beset the course.
I said that similar comments applied to New Zealand.
A bold move to freeing trade across the Tasman would
be an important element in the changed approaches that
both countries needed for their future development.
The trade relationships between the two countries
were set on an unfortunate course which could well lead
to the atrophy of the agreement or even to its breakdown
through recriminations and retaliations. This was
reflected in the outcome of negotiations on possible
additions to the schedules of the agreement, which I
listed as follows:
11th review (1975)
Carpet (wool) with quota (NZ only
importers facing quota)
doorbells and gongs, non-electric, of
base  metal
poultry brooders
ring-type grinders of type used in
laboratories
cast-iron vee pullies
bowls (lawn and indoor)
12th review
socket-head screws
horseshoes in high carbon steel
air, gas or steam silencers
(for industrial purposes)
13th review (1.7.76)
meat extract preparations in solid forms
(e.g .Oxo)
heraldic badges and crests (polyester)
photomechanical process plates (not
aluminium grained and anodised, and
not further worked) for use as
lithographic printing plates
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14th and 15th reviews – no additions
16th review (1.1.78)
phenolic formaldehyde foam (as used by
florists for fixing arrangements)
vinyl floor coverings (long-term




malleable cast-iron pipe fittings
cable climber winches
fire engines and fire escapes.
Somewhat embarrassed by the slow progress with
additions to schedule A, the governments had conceived
in 1973 the idea of adding new schedules B,C and D.
These would permit the freeing of trade in agreed
products subject to safeguards by quotas or other
arrangements against unrestricted competition.
Schedules C and D had not been used. Only furniture
and certain types of luggage had been brought in under
schedule B. The slow progress reflected the continuing
great sensitivity of governments on both sides of the
Tasman to any opposition to freeing of trade by interest
groups concerned about potential competition.
Despite this relatively limited progress in reducing
restrictions, trans-Tasman trade had multiplied six times
since NAFTA had come into effect. New Zealand’s
exports had increased ten-fold, so that the balance of
trade in Australia’s favour had been reduced from about
3.6:1 to1.8:1. The trading arrangements and the stimulus
they had provided to greater interaction had played
a part in the expansion. But other factors had been
more important, such as exchange variations and the
changing absolute and relative economic conditions in
the two countries.
These changing conditions, especially in Australia
as the competitive position of significant sections of
Australian manufacturing had diminished, had led to a
resurgence of protection. This had included restrictions
on imports from New Zealand, which frustrated gains
that New Zealand exporters had expected to make on the
Australian market. Similar frustration had, of course,
been felt by many potential Australian exporters to New
Zealand who had been confronted by import licensing
throughout the currency of the agreement.
There were encouraging signs that senior New
Zealand ministers, particularly the Deputy Prime
Minister, Brian Talboys, who had recently had a meeting
with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser at
Nareen, wanted faster progress towards the liberalisation
of trade and closer relationships. It was encouraging also
that New Zealand’s Prime Minister Rob Muldoon had
said that comments in the Planning Council’s reports on
New Zealand’s relationship with Australia were, “in
general, soundly based”. “There is no doubt”, he had
said, “that the future of our two countries lies together if
only because of our geography and this will remain true
as we develop ethnically in different directions. If
however we are to diminish trade barriers between the
two countries we shall have to go into that exercise
without too many reservations”.
Both governments seemed to be arguing that not
much progress could be expected because of serious
short-term problems. I expressed the personal opinion,
based on long experience, that if we carried on in that
way, it was unlikely that governments would ever find
the circumstances right for significant movement for the
freeing of trade, especially in ‘sensitive’ areas. Progress
would continue at a snail’s place and important
opportunities that could be grasped through a bolder
approach would be lost.
An essential requirement for real progress was a
commitment by both governments to free trade in most
products over a defined time period, in accordance with
an agreed plan embodying principles on which the
reduction of barriers would be based. The time period
could be as long as 15 years or so, so that necessary
adjustments could be made gradually and progress
reviewed regularly to see that both sides were gaining.
We would probably find, as the original Six did with the
EEC, that the problems were not as great as some had
feared and that progress could be accelerated. The
governments could exclude some products from the
process entirely, if compelling social, strategic or
economic reasons justified this. I hoped that the exempted
list would be kept short.
In discussing the question ‘what’s in it for Australia?’,
I acknowledged that the future economic relationship
with New Zealand had to be judged by whether it
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assisted or hindered Australia in the pursuit of its larger
interests elsewhere in the world. I quoted a recent article
by Dr Clive Edwards in the Australian Economic Review
in which he argued that –
… the Australian manufacturing sector is
vulnerable, and each time it succeeds in getting
more protection its vulnerability increases.
Protection increases profits today, but permits
managers to ignore the difficult decisions
required to achieve long-term cost
competitiveness in an international context …
the decision to modernise Australia’s
manufacturing sector in a way which encourages
manufacturers to extend their vision beyond
Australia needs to be made now.
I suggested that the freeing of trade across the
Tasman would be entirely consistent with such a
 policy decision.
The liberalisation of trade with New Zealand would
not in any way cut across Australia’s desire to strengthen
its trading links with other countries, especially the
members of ASEAN. Rather it should be seen as a means
of assisting the capacity of industries in both countries
to operate more competitively in international markets,
with lower protection overall.
I declared my own preference for a free trade area
approach rather than for customs union, at least in the
first instance. There could be a case for some
harmonisation of tariffs, controls or other policies in
areas of significance to either party. It would be easier to
negotiate such partial adjustments than to achieve the
full harmonisation required by complete customs union.
I hoped that Australia would not let short-term problems
and fears prevent it from sharing in an opportunity of
longer-term benefit to both countries from an agreed
form of economic integration.
Cautious Acceptance of the Need for
a New Approach
Attitudes on the New Zealand side had started to become
more positive by 1978. The visit by Brian Talboys to
Australia in March of that year, in which he explored
various proposals to strengthen economic cooperation,
was well received. His meeting with Malcolm Fraser at
Nareen was valuable. It indicated that the Australian
Prime Minister shared his desire for further cooperation
on a number of fronts. He had decided to replicate New
Zealand’s proposal to establish a Foundation to help
strengthen relations. He and Talboys approved of the
recent private initiative to form an Australia-New
Zealand Businessmen’s Council. But the communique
on their talks24  offered no suggestion of radical change
to the current approaches to the freeing of trade. The
Nareen Statement implied that because of the difficult
economic circumstances, it was not an appropriate time
to consider a major expansion of the economic
relationship. Happily, 18 months later, the reverse
seemed to apply.
Fraser’s more positive attitude to cooperation
encouraged the New Zealand delegation to the 1978
NAFTA ministerial meeting to seek an expression of the
intention of the two governments to expand free trade
coverage of NAFTA substantially within a period of 10
to 15 years. It would appear that Malcolm Fraser was
rather sceptical of the seriousness of New Zealand’s
intent on this matter, as the following submission to
Brian Talboys from Frank Corner on 16 October 197825
indicates:
You will recall that at Auckland Airport last
month Mr Fraser indicated that he regarded a
successful outcome of the current market
integration studies as most important. Mr Fraser
seemed to regard New Zealand’s ability to
respond positively as a touchstone of our
willingness to make a realistic contribution to
the development of a mutually satisfactory
economic relationship. He at least implied that
progress with NAFTA in the conventional way,
through additions to schedule A, was not on.
You will recall that he discounted, mentioning
the problem of ‘credibility’, Sir Frank
Holmes’ suggestion of a commitment by
both governments to free all trade within a
specified time.
Corner suggested that many influential Australians
saw the NAFTA relationship as being of decreasing
importance. Simply to maintain access to the Australian
market would probably require increased effort by New
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Zealand. The attitude of Australian politicians,
particularly Mr Fraser, would be critical. Fraser seemed
to view the overall relationship in terms of New Zealand’s
credibility in the trade field. It followed therefore that
the foreign policy arguments very strongly favoured a
positive response to the Australians on the market
integration question.
“Time for a Commitment to
Progress”
As Chairman of the Planning Council, I continued to
press the case for a full free trade area. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs published a copy of a submission I made
to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs on 1 August,
1979 in the New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review for
July-December 1979, in which I argued:26
In the affairs of nations as in the affairs of men
much depends on circumstances and on timing
in determining the directions which
developments will take. In the mid-1960s, the
circumstances were propitious from Australia’s
viewpoint for a considerable move forward
towards more integrated development of the
two Tasman neighbours. However, the
opportunity was lost, largely through fears on
the New Zealand side which may have seemed
justified to many at the time, but in retrospect
were shortsighted and greatly exaggerated.
Now, in the late 1970s, these New Zealand
fears are greatly reduced and there is a growing
appreciation that some bold new initiatives are
needed if the countries are to break out of
economic adversity which no-one would wish
to see persist. It is evident that the initiative
towards the negotiation of a commitment to
more integrated development must come from
the smaller partner.
I suggested that there were more positive attitudes
emerging that should enable negotiators to move on
from the past cautious, sector-by-sector approach to
freeing trade. Recent statements by Mr Anthony
suggested that senior Australian ministers now favoured
a more positive approach. The Australian Leader of the
Opposition also appeared to favour moves in that
direction. The political climate in New Zealand was
more conducive to a bold move forward, not only on the
government’s side. Mr Rowling, now Leader of the
Opposition, had spoken favourably about closer trans-
Tasman links, with the possible ultimate development of
a free trade area. He had noted, in my view correctly, that
closer links would involve “both sides getting rid
of some of their inhibitions” and general agreement
at prime ministerial level to get the relationship
moving again.
One of the most encouraging developments had
been the changing attitude of the Manufacturers’
Federation to trade strategy. This changing attitude, and
the general thrust of the early discussions of the
Businessmen’s Councils in Australia and New Zealand,
suggested that government decisions to adopt a bolder
approach could now secure a positive response from
most sections of the business community.
I reiterated my usual contention that the essential
requirement for progress was a commitment by both
governments to free trade in most products over a
defined time period of up to 15 years, subject to review,
with a short and diminishing list of exempted items.
My paper summarised the key issues that needed to
be addressed. I gave similar addresses to audiences on
both sides of the Tasman. The title I gave to one at a
Conference of the ANZ Businessmen’s Council in March
1980 – ‘An Outward Looking Coalition’ – sums up the
spirit of my approach.
It was gratifying that at a conference on the
relationship held at the ANU later in 1980,27  Sir John
Crawford, summing up, concluded, “ So let us welcome
Frank Holmes’ terms for an economic free trade area
and settle for an active coalition of outward-looking
partners”. His entire summary is worth reading, but the
spirit of it is reflected in the following selection of
quotations:
[Manufacturers] have not, in either country,
been through the restructuring process to the
degree that the rural industries have been … if
we allow the high cost sub-sectors … in either
country to call the tune for the whole sector and
for our total economic relations, then we will
want our heads read ... The more exceptions
that are allowed the less the gain is for New
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Zealand and Australia … the more we cripple
the bilateral relationship, the more we
weaken any prospect of securing an effective
multilateral dividend from our relations with
other countries ... If the bilateral relationship
is not whole hearted, I believe it will harm
our multilateral prospects.
Anthony Provokes More Action
My confidence that a better basis for negotiation was
emerging proved to be justified, but not quickly. The
major political breakthrough came when Hon. Doug
Anthony visited New Zealand in April 1979 for the
annual ministerial review of NAFTA. The official
documents now available, and Mr Anthony’s own
reflections on that visit, make it plain that he left little
doubt that Australian ministers saw no merit in
continuing the rather fruitless negotiations that had been
taking place under NAFTA.
The following is his own memory of his approach, as
he told an anniversary gathering in Wellington in
March 2003:
CER was born largely out of exasperation and
frustration on a flight from Hong Kong to
New Zealand with the head of my Department,
Jim Scully. We had been in Europe, North
America and Japan catching up on our trade
negotiations under the GATT round. Trading
blocks were being talked about in Europe,
America and Asia. With mounting unease I
thought about the unimaginative framework
that governed our trade with NZ. I re-read my
brief. It was a tired re-run of trivial issues that
had dogged us for years. NZ was focussed on
wallets, taps and cocks, and frozen peas.
Australia had a begging list for improved quotas
into NZ. If the discussions had turned out
successfully it would not have made a material
difference to a company, let alone a country. It
was trivial.  It did not warrant a meeting at any
level. Certainly not a Ministerial one.
So at our first meeting with Ministers and
Officials, I asked that the agenda be put aside
and that we begin to think and develop a new
framework for economic co-operation.
Everything should be on the table without any
preconceived ideas about the nature of any
agreement.
I of course had no Cabinet backing. The NZ
Ministers naturally had no basis to begin talking
until Prime Minister Muldoon was sounded
out. A meeting was urgently arranged. I noted
that NZ Ministers and officials were receptive,
but initially Rob Muldoon was quiet and said
little. I suspect that he was looking for an
Australian ambush. By the end of the meeting
we had the go-ahead to explore possibilities.
There were certainly many hitches and
stumbling blocks in the early years, but I must
say I had a very good rapport with Muldoon.
Strangely, I seemed to have his confidence.
Maybe because I was a good listener and only
worried about the nitty-gritty bits.
Speaking to New Zealand ministers across the table,
Anthony also apparently revealed a deep Australian
concern about what was seen to be New Zealand’s
continuing failure to face up to economic realities in its
policies. According to one New Zealand official,28
… as directly as decency allowed, he pointed to
the need for New Zealand to adopt policies
designed to reduce inflation, remove distortions
from the economy and set the scene for
economic growth. He implied that New Zealand
was increasingly becoming an economic
backwater, and that unless the government
introduced policies designed to take advantage
of resources we had [people and energy were
mentioned] New Zealand would continue to
stagnate. He alluded to devaluation, implying
that it was about time the New Zealand
Government appreciated the long-term value
of temporarily unpalatable medicines.
Most importantly from the viewpoint of future
progress in trans-Tasman negotiations, Mr Anthony
established a relationship of mutual respect and
confidence with New Zealand Prime Minister Muldoon.
Mr Muldoon, in writing shortly after that visit to Malcolm
Fraser, with whom he could not establish an easy rapport,
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said that he had found his discussions with Doug Anthony
“a stimulating exchange”. The time had come to make a
broad reassessment of the longer-term relationship
between the two countries. It was essential that they
should begin to do some solid work on the options.
In August 1979, Muldoon had a useful talk with
Fraser at a Commonwealth Heads of Government
Meeting in Lusaka. There they agreed that the NAFTA,
valuable though it had been in the past, was no longer
providing sufficiently strong impetus for economic
cooperation that made sense in the current difficult
economic environment. In pursuing cooperation, sudden
dislocations of the economies would have to be avoided.
Whatever was worked out would have to benefit each
country, otherwise it would not endure or command
public support. Their agreement gave the necessary
green light to officials on both sides to continue working
towards a much more satisfactory arrangement with
the objective of allowing the Prime Ministers and
other appropriate ministers to meet not later than
February 1980.
In New Zealand, there were still many manufacturers
who wanted to retain the status quo. Officials in most
departments had by then concluded that this was no
longer an option. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs Draft
Discussion Paper for the Officials’ Working Group in
New Zealand, released for the first time in the Negotiation
documents,29  pointed out that the status quo was at
variance with the trend in Australian policy thinking,
and indeed with the way in which official thinking had
moved in New Zealand. The NAFTA was not a free
trade area, but a preferential area approach. Competition
had been consciously avoided, by means such as panels,
a positive list of items included and highly disaggregated
additions to the free trade schedules.
As Les Castle had once put it, “the avoidance of
competition has run through the NAFTA like a theme in
a Greek play, but whether it is tragedy or comedy, I have
not yet decided”. There had been an exceptionally high
degree of administrative intervention. The form of
intervention had been quite unbalanced in New Zealand’s
favour. There had been no provision for the harmonisation
of policies that might lead to accusations that competition
was unfair. A decision by New Zealand to opt for the
status quo was likely to be negated in due course. It
would result in loosening of economic ties and increasing
frictions in the trading relationship. The foreign policy
implications of a decision not to pursue the options for
a closer economic relationship with Australia were
likely to be very serious.
The Manufacturers Accept the Need
for Change
The manufacturers’ organisations on both sides of the
Tasman were gradually coming to accept that the old
NAFTA approach would have to change. At the industry
association meetings in 1978, the Australian
manufacturers had made it plain that this approach was
no longer acceptable to them. At that stage they were
proposing that a customs union might be phased in when
NAFTA was due to expire seven years later. At meetings
in September 1980, the Australian manufacturers had
taken a hard line on the need for reciprocity. They
indicated that they would recommend that the
government should terminate the current agreement on
textiles and apparel.
Some members of the New Zealand delegation at
that meeting were still trying to get acceptance that inter-
industry consultations should be the building blocks of
any CER. However, industry leaders, such as Laurie
Stevens and Fred Turnovsky, had by then accepted that
this approach was no longer acceptable. The relatively
new Businessmen’s Council, in which some of these
leaders were involved, was even further along the road
to acceptance of the objective set by the Prime Ministers
in their communique after a meeting in March1980. The
endorsement by Fraser and Muldoon of “a gradual and
progressive liberalisation of trade across the Tasman of
all goods produced in either country on a basis that
would benefit both countries” was a milestone of
great importance in setting a positive underlying tone
to the negotiations.
By the early 1980s, there had been a significant
improvement in the confidence of New Zealand
manufacturers in their capacity to compete with their
Australian counterparts. One should not underestimate
the role played in New Zealand by Ian Douglas as
Executive Director of the Manufacturers’ Federation in
shifting the balance of opinion towards contemplation
of a commitment to a significant freeing of trans-Tasman
trade on a planned basis. He was also engineering a
dramatic shift in Federation policy towards planning for
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an increasing proportion of manufacturing output to be
exported from about 10% in 1979 to about 16% by 1984
and 20% two or three years after that.
In a meeting with Prime Minister Muldoon on 26
May 1981,30 Douglas was reported as saying that the
unresolved issues of export incentives and import
licensing were still difficult ones for the Federation.
They could possibly move to a terminal date for
quantitative restrictions of 1995, but he could not say so
at that time. However, he felt that the Federation had to
face up to the general question of protection. Detailed
industry studies, upon which the Federations and
governments had put so much emphasis as the precursors
to progress in NAFTA, had more disadvantages than
advantages. A macro approach (such as that embodied
in the Federation’s new approach to planning) was
preferable. When the Prime Minister told him that he
saw March 1982 as being the likely date for agreement
on CER, Mr Douglas could see no problem with
the timing.
The Continuing Problem of Political
Sensitivity
Nevertheless, Prime Minister Muldoon and other senior
ministers continued to be very concerned at the political
implications of any rapid change in the relationship.
They continued to place considerable weight on
avoiding public statements that might strengthen the
position of manufacturers and others opposed to any
change in the import licensing regime and other policies
of support to producers.
Notes of a discussion I had with the Prime Minister
on 28 March 1980 as Chairman of the Planning Council
illuminate his sensitivity on issues of protection. Bill
Birch, as Minister of National Development, had taken
me to see him to discuss the relationship between the
Planning Council’s work and other work going on in
government. Senior officials from the Treasury and
Prime Minister’s Department were present.
In the course of the discussion, Mr Birch noted that
the Council had helped establish a climate for change of
policy on CER. I applauded the initiatives the Prime
Minister was taking in relation to the agreement. In
response, the PM said that he and Fraser had isolated
some very real difficulties that had to be dealt with in the
political context. It was not helpful for the Planning
Council to make theoretical statements about it. Even if
he had some sympathy with the suggestions, they could
intensify the difficulties he had in getting support for his
policies from manufacturers like Laurie Stevens.
He was critical of a major report that we had
commissioned and published from Dr Peter Lloyd of the
ANU on trade policy. In retrospect this was probably
because Lloyd’s report recommended a much more
rapid phasing out of quantitative restrictions by New
Zealand than the manufacturers and Muldoon at that
stage were prepared to contemplate (and indeed than I
had been advocating). “Economists advocating
something politically unacceptable”, he said, “are not
good economists”.
The Prime Minister was also critical of a document
called He Matapuna. This was a collection of essays on
issues of Maori development that the Council had
organised on the basis of suggestions by its senior Maori
member. Mr Muldoon thought that we had provided a
forum for radical statements that did not represent the
broad views of Maori leaders. I argued that the Council
was charged in its Act with responsibilities for issuing
such documents as those we had commissioned from
Lloyd and the Maori writers to promote discussion of
important development issues. The Prime Minister
responded that the government could “uncharge” the
Council with some of those responsibilities.
The differences between Mr Muldoon’s private stance
and what he was saying in public caused some confusion
and concern. For example, Alan Wright, the president of
Federated Farmers, was surprised in mid-1980 that,
while Muldoon was adopting a public stance of coolness
towards a possible agreement, he was in fact “gung ho”
on making progress. Statements that Muldoon made in
the budget statement in July 1980 caused some concern
in Australia about his commitment. The Australian High
Commissioner felt it necessary to reassure Canberra, on
the basis of conversations with Hugh Templeton and
me, that the Prime Minister still seemed to be committed
to the process.
Muldoon’s counterpart across the Tasman, Malcolm
Fraser, was also sensitive to political pressures from
Australian producers attempting to influence the course
of the negotiations. He was unwilling to commit himself
to meetings which might not have a positive political
outcome for him and his government. His reservations
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led to some delay in the progress of the negotiations in
early 1981.
The attitudes of the Prime Ministers to one another
were something of a problem right up to the end of
the negotiations. According to Doug Anthony, in a
speech at an anniversary function in Wellington on
27 March 2003,
Their attitudes were as different as their heights
and on a couple of occasions I mentally observed
the CER wheels spinning in reverse. I recall
that Malcolm Fraser dreaded the possibility
that when all was concluded Rob would declare
that he had bested Australia. Sure enough a
couple of months later, Rob made a public
statement that he believed he had got the best of
the bargain. Within an hour the press descended
on me. I replied that if he feels like that I am
happy. Then with a smile on my face said, ‘As
a cattle dealer I have always made my customer
feel that he got a good deal’. They laughed, and
the matter was forgotten.
Resolving the Key Issues
New Zealand officials at a joint meeting of permanent
heads on 10-11 December 1980 found it disappointing
in comparison with the progress previously achieved.31
They told the New Zealand Cabinet Economic
Committee that the three principal outstanding issues
were access to Australia for New Zealand dairy exports,
differences on the speed of phasing out the licensing of
Australian imports into New Zealand and the purchasing
arrangements of state governments in Australia.
It had been hoped that the Prime Minister’s might
meet again in February 1981. However, at the beginning
of that month, Muldoon32  told the Australian High
Commissioner that he saw substantial political obstacles
in the way of agreement. In some instances, the problem
areas appeared to be insurmountable unless proposed
agreements were substantially altered.
It took Anthony some time to get agreement from
Fraser and his ministerial colleagues that he should visit
New Zealand again to try to resume progress at the
political level. Another constructive meeting between
Muldoon and Anthony on 11 and 12 May 1981 seemed
to clear away many of the less important outstanding
issues and to concentrate the attention of officials on a
briefer list that needed to be addressed.
Muldoon made it clear that the New Zealand
government did not share the view of the Manufacturers’
Federation that the agreement should be of finite duration
and subject to review and renewal, with no commitment
to complete liberalisation of imports from Australia.
The government looked towards a lasting relationship
that would move gradually and progressively to complete
liberalisation. However, they had not yet succeeded in
bringing the Manufacturers’ Federation to that point. It
was necessary to move sensitively on such aspects as
eventual free trade.
New Zealand had proposed an access formula that
would rapidly expand opportunities for Australian
exporters. It would be prepared to have a review after
five years and subsequent reviews to consider whether
revision to the formula was needed to fulfil the ultimate
objective. However, New Zealand was opposed to any
formal pre-fixing of an end date because that would
greatly strengthen opposition to the whole exercise.
Muldoon said that there was no basic difference
between New Zealand and Australia in their philosophy
on deferred items and access creation. Australia was
more anxious to foresee a final date. Both sides wanted
fair conditions of trade, with Australia having particular
concerns regarding export incentives and New Zealand
regarding government purchasing. Australia had certain
agricultural concerns, while New Zealand looked towards
orderly growth in its participation in the Australian dairy
market. He wanted a positive discussion on these issues,
taking account of the political factors.
Mr Anthony confirmed that Australia was sensitive
on issues like export incentives, which it was trying to
cut back; it had just announced a 50% reduction. It was
also concerned about import licensing and wished to
reach the ultimate objective of free trade in a meaningful
period of time.
With other New Zealand ministers and officials from
both sides, Muldoon and Anthony went through a long
list of both major and minor items of difference. At the
end of the meeting, Mr Anthony summarised the
outstanding issues. These were import licensing, where
there remained the knotty problem of concluding the
restrictions; export incentives on which the meeting had
come a long way; wine on which he would like to see the
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industries working out the problem; and dairy products
where he believed the industries could come together.
The Prime Minister agreed that those were the issues.
There was some distance still to go on some of them.
Discussing a press conference following the meeting,
Muldoon and Anthony agreed that they would not go
into too much detail on the timetable. The Prime Minister
said he would like to fudge some areas that were
increasingly sensitive. He did not see a Prime Ministers’
meeting in the immediate future. Perhaps he and Fraser
could spend a few minutes together at CHOGM, not
enough to reach finality but a discussion looking to
finalisation early in 1982. Mr Anthony concluded by
observing that a meeting later in 1981 between the two
Prime Ministers was possible, but even that might not be
convenient in that particular year.
More Consultations and Delays
1981-82
Against the background of these observations, it is not
surprising that the pace of proceedings slowed after this
meeting. Both sides felt it necessary to acquaint the
public fully with ‘exposure drafts’ on the present state
of the proposals and consider their responses. The Prime
Ministers did meet on 29 September 1981 at CHOGM.
They set a date of March 1982 for completion of the
agreement, and 1 January 1983, rather than July 1982
as previously intended, for the start of the operation.
It would in fact take until about the end of October
1982 before another meeting between these two men
would finally set the stage for completion of the
agreement. In the middle of 1981, the Ministry in
Wellington was becoming concerned that the Australian
government was giving very little attention to CER. At
CHOGM Mr Fraser indicated that one reason for
Australia’s ‘going slow’ was the New Zealand election.
Australia did not want to wake up any issues that might
prove difficult for New Zealand because of the election.
Mr Muldoon said there were no real political problems
in the sense Mr Fraser suggested. This is another example
of the intrusion of political considerations affecting the
timetable of negotiations.
In February 1982, Australian officials were warning
the New Zealand High Commissioner that it was vital to
move quickly to bring negotiations to a conclusion.
They believed the Australian political environment and
economy would become more uncertain and troubled in
the months ahead. The government was being subjected
to increasing criticism of its economic policies. It could
not be ruled out that Mr Fraser would decide to call a
general election before things deteriorated too far.
Against this background, it was significant and
fortuitous that Hugh Templeton, an enthusiast for
progress with integration, should have been made
Minister of Trade Industry by Muldoon. He had
previously preferred a minister with protectionist
inclinations, Lance Adams-Schneider. Templeton visited
Australia for discussions with Doug Anthony and John
Howard in March 1982. The meeting made progress
towards a closer meeting of minds on major sticking
points. It was apparently helpful to Anthony in getting
Cabinet backing for the negotiating brief he wanted to
help overcome difficulties in the next phase of his efforts
to reach agreement.33 That the import licensing and
export incentive issues remained politically difficult
was, however, evident in Templeton’s meeting with
Fraser on the following day.34
A meeting of Australian and New Zealand permanent
heads in Canberra shortly afterwards made progress, but
New Zealand officials were not authorised to offer
views on the major matters of concern to Australia.
Officials agreed that they were matters that could only
be resolved at ministerial level. An Australian official
report to Fraser was pessimistic about the outcome of the
ministerial meeting scheduled for the following week.
In his view New Zealand had not demonstrated that it
was willing to come to grips with the critical issues.
Australian officials believed that New Zealand would
ultimately accept the Australian position, but the degree
of acceptance could not be predicted. There were
presentational reasons in both countries why the meeting
might not produce a clear-cut outcome. The New Zealand
government’s position was seen as quite precarious,
with a majority of one seat subject to legal challenge and
two senior ministers having suffered heart attacks. Mr
Anthony would discuss a possible exposure draft with
New Zealand ministers, but as a result of those
presentational issues, it might not appear for some time.
Anthony’s meeting with New Zealand ministers on
20 and 21 April did make some further progress on both
substantive and presentational issues. Neither side was
prepared to come to a final conclusion on the most
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important differences without further consultation with
affected interests. But New Zealand advanced things
greatly by undertaking that, if an agreement between the
manufacturers’ organisations was not reached, New
Zealand could agree to 1995 as a terminal date for
quantitative restrictions.
Subsequent discussions by officials led to a package
which meant the major outstanding Australian objectives
on termination dates for New Zealand export incentives
(30 June 1987) and import licensing (1995) had been
met. New Zealand had obtained arrangements that
seemed reasonably satisfactory to its interests on
safeguards and on government-to-government
purchasing. The two governments agreed to the release
on 4 June of a report outlining proposals for a closer
economic relationship between the two countries.
At a meeting between the Prime Ministers in Sydney
on 10 June 1982, Mr Fraser said that he expected to go
to Cabinet early in August. Mr Muldoon said some
industry groups had raised problems. He had felt obliged
to say publicly that, if there were genuine practical
problems that could not be resolved, New Zealand
would have to seek amendments to the draft agreement.
He did not, however, anticipate there would be much
change from the New Zealand side. Mr Fraser also
indicated that there had been criticisms from the
Confederation of Australian Industry and some other
groups. The consultation process in Australia was more
complex than in New Zealand because of the need to
consult states. States had raised the question of structural
adjustment assistance, which he rejected.
The consultations and briefings that took place in
Australia led Anthony, on behalf of the Australian
Cabinet, to write to Muldoon on 5 October wishing to
discuss further a number of concerns. The concerns
were not confined to terminal dates for import licensing
and export incentives and the initial levels generated by
the proposed formula for access. They extended to the
adequacy of safeguard arrangements, procedures for
resolving intermediate goods problems, proposed
methods for allocating exclusive licences and a number
of specific commodity issues.
This caused some consternation and some internal
tension among the New Zealand officials, although
Australian officials had implied that a form of words that
would make the issues cosmetically more acceptable for
Mr Anthony would suffice. As Simon Murdoch put it to
Merwyn Norrish,35  it was a “plan for the worst and hope
for the best” outlook. He noted that the fundamental
objectives of CER had not been criticised. What
New Zealand was being asked to do was to ‘grease
 the track’ more, especially the early stages of access
 for Australian producers.
Much haggling occurred on a variety of issues at a
meeting between Muldoon and Anthony on 28 October.
Although progress was made towards reconciling
differences, the officials were still left with several
knotty problems to resolve. These were subsequently
complicated further by some trouble over forest products,
which had provoked some administrative action in
Australia against New Zealand imports. In addition, the
manufacturers in New Zealand wanted assurances that
the government would not sign the agreement until
some problems over countervailing duties were resolved.
The Prime Minister would not give them that assurance.
He told them that signature of the agreement would take
place on 14 December.
There was some debate on the name of the new
agreement. The main point of contention was Australia’s
wish that the title should include the words ‘free trade’.
It was decided that the ‘Australia New Zealand Closer
Economic Relations Trade Agreement’ would be
acceptable. Anthony and Muldoon felt able to sign the
Heads of Agreement during a two-way satellite
transmission at noon on 14 December 1982.
This was not quite the end of the matter. On 28
February 1983, the Australian government decided that
the Treaty should not be signed until after the Australian
election. This was a disappointment to Jim Scully,
leader of the official negotiations for Australia, as well
as to New Zealand. However, New Zealand’s High
Commissioner, Laurie Francis, had managed to contact
the leaders of the Labour Party, Messrs. Hawke and
Keating. They had reassured him that they would be in
sympathy with the arrangements. Laurie Francis and
Lionel Bowen finally signed the Agreement in Canberra
on 28 March 1983.
Conclusion
After this tortuous political process, what had previously
been considered unrealistic or politically impracticable
had become a practical reality. We had a commitment
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by both governments to free trade in practically all
products over a defined time period in accordance with
an agreed plan.
Sir Robert Muldoon came to regard the negotiation
of CER as one of the great achievements of his term as
Prime Minister. In public, he always emphasised that
he was fighting to retain the continuation of licensing
protection and the tax incentives that were a hallmark
of his brand of policy. He never gave the impression
that he was fully committed to the importance of
achieving a free trade agreement with the Australians.
His public stance was geared to keeping the
manufacturers with him and his own party in office The
negotiation documents indicate that he was in fact
playing a more positive and constructive role in the
negotiation process than his public statements
suggested.
The prime ministerial brinkmanship involved on
both sides did threaten from time to time to derail the
process. The final successful outcome owed a great
deal to the patient diplomacy of his colleagues Talboys
and Templeton, the dedicated work of senior officials
on both sides of the Tasman, and the continuing goodwill
and political skill of Doug Anthony in mustering
sufficient support from his Prime Minister and Cabinet
colleagues.
The Muldoon government was swept away by the
snap election of 1984. The political change did not
threaten the continuity of CER. The senior ministers
mainly responsible for trade policy found it congenial.
CER provided a very useful stepping stone for Roger
Douglas’s policy of opening up the New Zealand
economy to greater competition. David Caygill was
always favourably disposed to freer trade. And Mike
Moore, who once thought that he would make political
capital opposing economic integration with Australia,
had become a convert to the CER idea.
Accordingly, CER has continued to enjoy bipartisan
support from the major parties. As I had expected, the
1995 deadline for which Sir Robert had fought so hard
was not in fact required. Once the idea of gradually
eliminating barriers had been accepted, it was possible
to achieve the virtually complete freeing of trans-
Tasman trade in goods by 1990.
Endnotes
1 See FW Holmes (1957) ‘The Commonwealth and
the Free Trade Area’. In The European Common
Market and Free Trade Area, London: University
of London and Institute of Bankers, pp 58-73.
2 GJ Schmitt (2002) Tasman: The Early Years.
Privately published by the author, indicates that Sir
James made the suggestion of some sort of free
trade agreement at a Fletcher annual meeting in
1957. JC Fletcher and Arthur Jewell had apparently
thought it was made at a Tasman annual meeting.
3 FW Holmes (1961) ‘Should We Have Free Trade
between Australia and New Zealand?’, NZ Institute
of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 1.
4 Report No. 2 of the Monetary and Economic
Council  – Economic Growth in New Zealand, May
1962. Government Printer, pp 33-35.
5 The leading manufacturer, Fred Turnovsky, who
generally admired and supported the views of
Sutch, apparently had similar experiences. He noted
that Sutch “forcefully expressed his views as though
they represented a self-evident truth”. He had a
“compulsive urge for acknowledgement by his
peers”; he was “most of ease … when his
dominance went unchallenged”. See Fred
Turnovsky (1990) Turnovsky, 50 years in New
Zealand, Allen and Unwin, p 119.
6 An example is a substantial paper prepared in the
New Zealand High Commission in Canberra in May
1964 on the free trade project. It warned Wellington
that New Zealand’s objectives for trade in forest
products were being undermined by the approach
that favoured market sharing and wanted to see no
damage to any interest group. Jack Shepherd, in
sharing ideas with me, said “We will get nowhere
unless this subject becomes an issue of informed
public debate”.
7 FW Holmes (1 March 1965) ‘Freer Trade with
Australia?’, New Zealand Economist and Taxpayer,
pp 503-506.
8 Op. cit.
9 John Marshall, Memoirs, Vol. 2: 1962 to 1988, p
28. For his account of the negotiations, see chapter
III, pp 19-28.
10 Pages 4-10 of this discussion paper were
recommended for a summary of the provisions of
the Agreement and for “an excellent description of
events leading up to the signing” by Professor Ian
McDougall of Massey University in ‘New Zealand-
Australia Free Trade Area Agreement – a Review’,
in New Zealand Economic Papers, Vol. 1, No. 2,
Autumn 1967.
11 FW Holmes (1973) in ‘The Future of NAFTA –
Problems of Expanding the New Zealand Australia
Free Trade Agreement’, Bank of New South Wales
Review, December, p 15.
12 HG Lang (August 1973) ‘The relationship between
economic and foreign policy’, New Zealand
Foreign Affairs Review, pp 16-25.
13 References to the articles written between 1961 and
1967 by Peter Elkan, Bill Sutch, Bruce Bentick,
ips policy paper seventeen •  27
Alan Robinson and me on the issue of free trade
across the Tasman are listed at the end of the
McDougall Review cited above.
14 McDougall (1967), op. cit., pp 42-48.
15 See PJ Lloyd (1976) Economic Relationships
between Australia and New Zealand. Department
of Economics, Research School of Pacific Studies,
ANU, Canberra.
16 GJ Schmitt (2002) op.cit.
17 Hon RD Muldoon (1969) Economic Review,
Wellington: Government Printer.
18 Holmes (1973), op. cit., p 16.
19 Ibid.
20 Holmes (1973), op. cit., p 17.
21 F Turnovsky, President, New Zealand
Manufacturers’ Federation. The Future of NAFTA.
In the Proceedings and Papers of a Seminar on New
Zealand-Australia Cooperation organised by the
Department of University Extension, Victoria
University of Wellington, in conjunction with The
Centre the Continuing Education, Australian
National University, 31 August to 2 September
1973, pp 68-94.
22 Sir Frank Holmes (September 1978) Some
Reflections on a Visit to Australia, New Zealand
Planning Council  No. 10, pp 8.
23 Sir Frank Holmes (July 1978) Australian
Relationships with New Zealand: a Presentation to
the Study Group on Structural Adjustment,
Canberra, ACT, New Zealand Planning Council.
24 Nareen Statement. In The Negotiation of the
Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations
Trade Agreement 1983 (The Negotiation),
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Trade (2003) pp 1-4.
25 The Negotiation (2003), pp 28-29.
26 Australia-New Zealand Relations: Time for a
Commitment to Progress, pp 26-31.
27 Robin and Alan Burnett (eds) (1981) ‘Australia-
New Zealand Relations – Issues for the 1980s’,
Proceedings of an ANU Public Affairs Confeerence,
12-14 August, 1980, Canberra: ANU Press, p 177.
28 Note from Shallcrass to Lough, The Negotiation
(2003), pp 32-33.
29 Op. cit., pp 258-266.
30 See File Note: Record of Meeting by Turkington,
Wellington, 26 May 1981. The Negotiation (2003)
pp 606-607.
31 Op. cit., p 409.
32 Op. cit., p 433
33 Op. cit., pp 628-30.
34 Op. cit., pp 542-44. The Negotiation volume makes
it difficult to follow the course of discussions
chronologically, in part because it separates the
Australian documents from the New Zealand ones.
This Australian document on the Templeton visit,
for example, is over 80 pages away from the New
Zealand document on his visit.
35 Op. cit., pp 661-663.




The Constitutional and Policy Challenges
by Jonathan Boston, Simon Murdoch, Marie Shroff, Rt Hon. Sir Michael Hardie Boys
1999 • ISSN 1174-8982 • ISBN 0-908935-35-8
• Number 2
Partnership - From Practice to Theory
edited by David Robinson
1999 • ISSN 1174-8982 • ISBN 0-908935-41-2
• Number 3
Stability of Retirement Income Policy
edited by Arthur Grimes and Conal Smith
1999 • ISSN 1174-8982 • ISBN 0-908935-41-2
• Number 4
Counting the Beat:
Culture, Democracy and Broadcasting
edited by Arthur Grimes and Jo Tyndall
1999 • ISSN 1174-8982 • ISBN 0-908935-43-9
• Number 5
South Korea-NZ Relations at a Watershed:
Impact of the Financial Crisis
by Gerald McGhie
2000 • ISSN 1174-8982 • ISBN 0-908935-45-5
• Number 6
The Tomorrow’s Schools Reforms:
An American Perspective
by Edward B Fiske and Helen F Ladd




2000 • ISSN 1174-8982 • ISBN 0-908935-50-1
• Number 8
On Three Arguments For the Efficiency Criterion
by Paul Calcott
2001 • ISSN 1175-8201 • ISBN 0-908935-60-9
• Number 9
Defence Objectives and Funding
by Arthur Grimes and James Rolfe
2001 • ISSN 1175-8201 • ISBN 0-908935-61-7
ips policy paper seventeen •  29
• Number 10
Charity, Charity Law and Civil Society
by Richard Fries
2001 • ISSN 1175-8201 • ISBN 0-908935-62-5
• Number 11
Public Wealth and Trusts
by Peter McKinlay
2001 • ISSN 1175-8201 • ISBN 0-908935-63-3
• Number 12
Environmental Taxation in New Zealand:
What Place Does it Have?
by Frank Scrimgeour and Ken Piddington
2002 • ISSN 1175-8201 • ISBN 0908935-64-1
• Number 13
Changing Gear: Delivering the Social Dividend
edited by Arthur Grimes




2002 • ISSN 1175-8201 • ISBN 0-908935-66-8
• Number 15
Watch Out for the Elephants
by Colin James
2002 • ISSN 1175-8201 • ISBN 0-908935-70-6
• Number 16
Negotiating Without Bargaining Power:
A Review of ‘New Zealand’s Trade Policy Odyssey’
by Frank Holmes
2002 • ISSN 1175-8201 • ISBN 1-877347-00-0
 ips policy paper seventeen •  30
